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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
is nonetheless held liable for the results of his negligence.18 It
would seem that this general rule that the defendant takes his
victim as he finds him would be equally applicable in the instant
type of case.
The general rule, also relied upon to some extent by the court
in the instant case, that a defendant is not liable for physical
injury resulting from a plaintiff's fear for a third person, has
had its usual application in situations where the plaintiff is
not within the zone of danger.' 9 Seemingly, the reason for this
rule is to enable the courts to deal with case where difficulties
of proof militate against establishing the possibility of recovery.
It would seem, however, that in a situation where the plaintiff
is within the zone of danger and consequently could recover if
he feared for himself, the mere fact that he feared for another
should not preclude recovery. Since a person in a frightening
situation does not have complete control over the direction his
mind takes, there seems no good reason for penalizing him for
not fearing for his own safety. No matter what mental
gymnastics are undergone, the result reached is still the same;
physical injury resulted from negligently caused fright.
Raymond M. Allen
TORTS - TRESPASS TO LAND - LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL
INJURIES
Plaintiff brought an action in trespass quare clausum fregit
for damages to real property and personal injuries occasioned
by the trespass. Plaintiff was a tenant in possession of certain
premises. Defendant drove a truck onto the premises and dam-
aged the steps of plaintiff's home. Nine days later plaintiff was
injured by falling while attempting to use the broken steps. In
his petition, plaintiff made no allegation that defendant was neg-
ligent when he damaged the steps. The trial court granted de-
fendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that this was a con-
sequential injury for which recovery could not be had. On appeal
1 8
. Patterson v. Steamship Jefferson Myers, 45 F.2d 162 (1930) ; Kalaf v.
Assyd, 60 Ariz. 33, 130 P.2d 1036 (1942) ; Campbell v. Los Angeles Traction
Co., 137 Cal. 565, 70 Pac. 624 (1902); Hahn v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 92
N.J.L. 277, 105 Atl. 459 (1918).
19. Southern R.R. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916); Cleveland,
C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E 917 (1900) ; Nuckles
v Tennessee Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927) ; Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
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to the Court of Appeal of Florida, held, reversed.' There was in-
sufficient evidence to rule as a matter of law that the injury was
not, as alleged, a direct and proximate result of the trespass,
and testimony must be taken to determine the truth of this alle-
gation. "If the injury was, in fact, direct and immediate, it is a
trespass; but on the other hand, if it is consequential or col-
lateral it will be case." Leonard v. Nat Harrison Associates, Inc.,
122 So.2d 432 (Fla. App. 1960).
In certain situations it is preferable to bring an action in
trespass rather than on a negligence theory of trespass on the
case. In trespass it is unnecessary to show negligence toward
the particular injury which is caused by the trespass,2 and de-
fendant does not have the defense of contributory negligence. 8
To support any action of trespass, 4 defendant's act must cause an
injury by the direct application of force.5 In trespass to land
the direct injury required to establish the action is an injury to
plaintiff's right of possession. This necessary direct injury is
done and the action is established when defendant does an act
which occasions a direct entry onto plaintiff's property.6 On the
other hand, if defendant's act does not occasion a direct entry,
but the entry is an indirect or consequential result of that act,
trespass will not lie.7 Thus, when one hurls a ball onto the prop-
erty in possession of another and breaks a window, the instant
1. On appeal, the defendant conceded that a trespass had been committed, and
that plaintiff was entitled to at least nominal damages. This of itself necessitated
a reversal by the appellate court, since the trial court had dismissed the entire
suit.
2. St. Petersburg Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So.2d 670 (Fla.
App. 1950) ; Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N.Y. Supp.
726 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 380, comment c (1934).
3. St. Petersburg Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So.2d 670 (Fla.
App. 1950).
4. Although trespass may be characterized as intentional, it is not necessary
that the actor intends to trespass; it is only necessary that the actor intends to
enter the land which, in fact, is in the possession of another. RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 164 (1934). It is no defense that he thinks that he has the owner's
consent, Jackson v. Pettrigrew, 133 Mo. App. 508, 133 S.W. 672 (1908), thinks
that he is privileged to enter, Blatt v. McBarron, 161 Mass. 21, 36 N.E. 468
(1894), or that he owns the land, May v. Tappan, 23 Cal. 306 (1863) ; Ball &
Bros. Lumber Co. v. Simms Lumber Co., 121 La. 627, 46 So. 674, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.)
244 (1908).
5. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 2 (1906) ("In the field of
trespass liability is based solely upon the fact that damage is directly done by
force.") ; PROSSER, TORTS 56 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Investment Securities Corp. v. Cole, 57 Ga. App. 97, 100, 194 S.E. 411, 413
(1937), aff'd, 186 Ga. 809, 199 S.E. 126 (1938) ("The gist of such an action of
trespass is the injury done to possession of the property.") ; Mawson v. Vess
Beverage Co., 173 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. App. 1943) ; Thrasher v. Hodge, 86 Mont.
218, 283 Pac. 219 (1929) ; Steinfeld v. Morris, 16 N.Y.S.2d 155, 258 App. Div.
228 (1939).
7. HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 1.3 (1956) ; STREET, TORTS 62 (1955).
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the ball crosses the property line, the trespass is established. On
the other hand, if one builds a baseball diamond for the neigh-
borhood children and one of these children hits a ball onto an-
other's property, there is no trespass committed by the builder
of the diamond, even though he may have created an unreason-
able risk toward the other's property. The entry of the ball onto
the other's property is an indirect or consequential result of the
act of building the diamond.
Having established a trespassory entry, the trespassory ob-
ject may cause injury by directly applying force to the thing
injured, or the force expended by the object may create a dan-
gerous condition which exists after the trespass has ceased and
the dangerous condition may be the cause of the injury. Thus,
when defendant hurls a ball onto another's property, when the
ball penetrates the close the trespass is established. When the
ball strikes the window there is a direct physical injury occa-
sioned by the trespassory object. When the glass falls to rest
upon the floor and the possessor comes to investigate and cuts
his foot on the glass, there is an indirect or consequential injury
caused by the trespassory entry. Care must be taken to dis-
tinguish between the indirect or consequential results of an act
which does not support an action of trespass and the indirect or
consequential results of a trespassory entry. The courts use the
same terminology when dealing with both of these closely related
problems.
When the trespass is established, plaintiff may recover at
least nominal damages for the wrongful entry onto his prop-
erty.8 In addition, the trespasser is strictly liable for the in-
juries caused by a direct application of force.9 Once a trespass-
ory invasion is established, most courts allow recovery under the
strict liability of trespass for some of the injuries which are not
occasioned by the direct application of force, but arise as an
indirect or consequential result of it.10 The courts have termed
8. Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E.2d 804 (1940) ; Schumpert v. Moore,
24 Tenn. App. 695, 149 S.W.2d 471 (1940).
9. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 380 (1934). Ure v. United States, 93 F. Supp.
779 (D.C. Ore. 1950), aff'd sub nom., White v. United States, 193 F.2d 505 (9th
Cir. 1952), rev'd, Ure v. United States, 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955). The de-
cision was reversed on the theory that the Federal Torts Claims Act may be
invoked on a "negligent or wrongful act or omission," but the absolute liability
of trespass caused by extrabazardous activity is not grounds for recovery against
the United States.
10. In Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tele. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N.Y. Supp.
726, 729 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937), in allowing recovery for dogs which were poisoned
by lead dropped by a telephone linesman while repairing a cable, the court stated:
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these recoverable consequential injuries "proximate," "natural,"
and "necessary consequences" of the trespass. Thus the prob-
lem arises as to how to distinguish between those consequential
injuries which are recoverable, hence within the protected risk
of the strict liability of trespass, and those which are too remote
for recovery under trespass.
In the instant case, since the original force had terminated
nine days previously, the personal injury was clearly a conse-
quential result of the defendant's trespassory entry and subse-
quent direct injury to the steps.' 2 The plaintiff alleged no negli-
gence in the injury to the steps. He may have been unable to
prove negligence, or more probably, he did not allege it in order
to avoid giving defendant the defense of contributory negligence.
In any event, plaintiff alleged that the personal injury was a
direct and proximate result of the trespass and based his cause
of action on the theory that the consequential injury of the tres-
passory entry was recoverable under the strict liability of tres-
pass. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff's
personal injury was remote; "the effect of the direct invasion
was broken," and the recovery, if any, should lie in trespass on
the case.' 3 Thus, the court of appeal had to decide whether to
allow recovery for any consequential injuries of a trespass, and,
if so, whether the personal injury in the instant case was too
remote for recovery as a matter of law. Since the trespass was
clearly established in the instant case, and the personal injury
was clearly a consequential result of that trespass, it would seem
"It does not matter that the plaintiff here seeks recovery, not for direct damage
to his soil or to vegetation or structures, but for consequential damages. Recovery
does not depend upon directness of the damage. The test is whether there was a
direct invasion." (Emphasis added.)
11. Walker v. Ingram, 251 Ala. 395, 396, 37 So.2d 685, 686 (1948) ("when
a trespass to property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely,
mental suffering may be compensated for, when it is a proximate consequence.") ;
Herzog v. Grosso, 41 Cal.2d 219, 225, 259 P.2d 429, 433 (1953) ("Once a cause
of action for trespass or nuisance is established, an occupant of land may recover
damages for annoyance and discomfort that would naturally ensue therefrom.") ;
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 313 Ky. 85, 90, 230 S.W.2d 92, 96, 21 A.L.R.2d
373, 378 (1950) ("trespasser is responsible in damages for all consequences
flowing from his trespass which are the natural and proximate result of his con-
duct") ; Curtis v. Fruin-Colnon Contracting Co., 253 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo. App.
1952) ("defendant is responsible for damages to plaintiff's property naturally and
necessarily resulting from the trespass").
12. 1 CmTTY, PLEADINGS 126 (8th Amer. ed. 1840) : "An injury is considered
as immediate when the act complained of itself, and not merely a consequence of
that act, occasions the injury."
13. It is not clear from the opinion whether the trial court meant that there
could be no recovery for consequential injuries of a trespass or that this par-




that the appellate court, in reversing, recognized that some con-
sequential injuries are recoverable, under the strict liability
theory. In disposing of the case, the court stated, "If the injury
was, in fact direct and immediate, it is a trespass; but on the
other hand, if it is consequential or collateral it will be case."
Although this language appears to be a reiteration of the test
for trespass-case distinction, since the trespass was clearly es-
tablished in the instant case, this language would seem to be di-
rected toward the problem of determining which consequential
injuries are recoverable under trespass. The court is apparently
saying that if the consequential injury is a direct and immediate
result of the trespass, it is within the protected risk of the strict
liability of trespass. Viewed in this fashion, it would seem that
underlying this language is the same concept which other courts
have expressed as proximate, natural, and necessary results of
a trespass.
On the basis of the decisions in this area, there seem to be
five major factors which motivate the courts to classify a con-
sequential injury as a natural or proximate result of the tres-
pass, and hence within the protected risk of the strict liability
of trespass. (1) Intent of the trespasser. If the trespasser in-
tends harm, the courts do not hesitate to extend the recovery for
consequential injury to extreme lengths. 14 However, if the tres-
passer merely intends the act which occasions the trespass, the
courts tend to be much more restrictive in the consequential in-
juries for which they allow recovery. 15 (2) Whether the land-
owner could have avoided the damages. The landowner should
not be required to prepare himself in advance against the threat
of danger from a trespasser, 1 but once an injury occurs, he may
be required to use reasonable care to prevent further injury. 1"
Thus, if the trespasser removes a fence, he is liable for the escape
of cattle.'8 However, he is not liable when the owner sees the
fence being destroyed and makes no reasonable effort to prevent
14. When defendant raided plaintiff's plantation and carried away some of
the slaves and frightened the others away, recovery was allowed for wood stacked
on the bank of a river which was carried away in a flood because the slaves
were not present to move it, for crops lost for lack of attention, for crops de-
stroyed because cattle broke down the fence, and loss of services of the slaves.
McAfee v. Crofford, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 447 (1851). See generally Bauer, Degree
of Moral Fault as Affecting Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 586 (1933) ; RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 163, comment e (1934).
15. PROSSER, TORTS 338-39 (2d ed. 1955). See generally Harper, Liability
Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 Micn. L. REV. 1001 (1932).
16. 25 C.J.S., Damages § 33 (1955).
17. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 918 (1934).
18. Damron v. Roach, 4 Humph. (23 Tenn.) 134 (1843).
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the cattle from escaping.19 Although contributory negligence is
generally said not to be a defense to trespass,20 assumption of
risk does constitute a defense.2 1 This should mean nothing more
than that the risk protected does not include those consequential
injuries of which the landowner is fully apprised, and could
avoid by reasonable care. Consequently if a landowner discovers
a dangerous condition created by a trespasser and unreasonably
exposes himself or his property to danger, there should be no
liability placed upon the trespasser for this damage. (3) Inter-
vening forces. Forces over which the trespasser has no control
may intervene as a cause of the damage. But if the trespasser
creates a risk that these forces might intervene, he should be
liable for the resulting harm.22 Thus, one who wrongfully re-
moves a fence creates a risk that animals might enter to damage
the crops of the landowner. 2 However, it cannot be said that the
trespasser will be liable for damage done by all forces operating
on the dangerous condition he created. The owner of a train
which was negligently wrecked upon the plaintiff's property was
not held liable for damage caused by spectators who were at-
tracted to the property.24  (4) Time and distance. It appears
that the facts of each case must be considered to determine if the
chain of causation is broken by extreme distance or periods of
time. Where the landowner is unable to prevent or avoid the
damage, considerable lengths of time may be allowed between
the trespass and the resulting harm.25 But where the landowner
can avoid the consequences, only a reasonable time should be al-
lowed. (5) The strangeness of the resulting injury. The act of
19. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 918, Illustration 5 (1934).
20. St. Petersburg Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So.2d 670 (Fla.
App. 1950).
21. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893 (1934). See PROSSER, TORTS § 55, at 303
(2d ed. 1955).
22. See PROSSER, TORTS § 49 (2d ed. 1955).
23. Garrett v. Sewell, 108 Ala. 521, 18 So. 737 (1895) ; Mecartney v. Smith,
62 Pac. 540 (Kan. App. 1900) (one who destroys a building exposes the land-
owner and his property to inclement weather).
24. Scholes v. North London R.R., 21 L.T.R.(N.S.) 835 (C.P. 1870) (It is
interesting to note, however, that in this case, he was held liable for damage
caused during the removal of the train).
25. When defendant removed gravel from a dam, recovery was allowed when
the dam was washed away three weeks later in a flood. Dickinson v. Boyle, 34
Mass. 78 (1835). When defendant trespassed by allowing lead to fall on plain-
tiff's property, recovery was allowed for a dog who ate the lead and was poisoned
two weeks later, and for another dog who ate the lead about a month later. Van
Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N.Y. Supp. 726 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1937). Defendant trespassed by cutting several feet into plaintiff's property
to build a road. This removal of dirt caused the land on plaintiff's property to
slip and slide. Recovery was allowed for the erosion which continued over a
period of several months. Defendant attempted to prevent further damage, but
failed. Whitehead v. Zeiller, 265 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
19611
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trespass may start a chain of events which may result in strange
and unusual injuries. A farmer's cow escaped, entered a neigh-
bor's barn, and fell through the floor into a cistern. Later the
neighbor entered the barn and fell through the broken floor
and was seriously injured. No recovery was allowed by the
court on the ground that the injury was not such as would
usually and probably result from the escape and subsequent tres-
pass of defendant's cow. 26
It is submitted that on the basis of the above analysis, the
court reached an appropriate result in the instant case, although
the language used seems to be unduly confusing. The trial court
noted that nine days in which plaintiff could use and observe
the broken steps had elapsed and held that this broke the effect
of the direct invasion. At first blush, nine days seems to be a
long time between the termination of the trespass and the re-
sulting direct consequential injury. However, courts have al-
lowed recovery in cases where the resulting injury occurred
several weeks after the termination of the trespass.27 Apparently,
it was felt that the trial court should not have ruled as a matter
of law on this point without the introduction of further testi-
mony. However, if this was the only exit to plaintiff's home,
and it was not possible to have the steps repaired, then the
knowledge of the danger might not preclude recovery. Since
evidence which would enable the court to consider this and
other factual situations which might exist did not appear in the
record, it seems that the court was not willing to affirm until
these possibilities were explored.
Charley J. Schrader, Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - PSYCHOSIS RESULTING FROM
DAILY ASSEMBLY LINE PRESSURES
Plaintiff brought suit to recover workmen's compensation for
a psychosis resulting from emotional pressures encountered in
daily assembly line work. The defendant denied that a mental
disorder precipitated solely by usual mental stimulus constituted
a compensable disability, due to the lack of any single event
causing plaintiff's breakdown. The referee entered an award
26. Hollenbeck v. Johnson, 79 Hun. 499, 29 N.Y. Supp. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
27. See note 24 aupra.
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